PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Duke University; date: 03 September 2016 of a beginningless universe, a view that derives from Proclus's pupil Ammonius (who was reconciling Aristotle with Plato's Timaeus) and from the Plotinian Theology of Aristotle; the view was consolidated in the tenth century by the Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī, in a work called The Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages, the Divine Plato and Aristotle, whence it came to Avicenna and Maimonides, who bestowed it on thirteenth-century Latin philosophers. The point is that Aristotle, as he reentered the late-medieval world, was highly Neoplatonized (if he was not a Platonist himself), and Plato, as he reached Augustine and Christianity through Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius, had already once assimilated Aristotle. The great historian of medieval philosophy Van Steenberghen has said that we should not think of the conflict between Franciscans (Bonaventure and Pecham) and Dominicans (Aquinas) in later medieval thought as a conflict between an Augustinian system and an Aristotelian system, but as a tension between "two unequally developed forms of Latin Aristotelianism." When we impose "schools" on medieval thinkers, we need only remember that they thought, or could think, that Aristotle wrote the Liber de causis. Studiorum Ducem (1923), and Humani Generis (1950) . Ironically, given the conservative backlash against Aquinas in his own time (nine propositions of the Condemnations of 1277 are from Aquinas, and thirty involve his teachings), the movement was itself a reaction to "modernist" philosophy. It prompted several Catholic theologians and scholars, the most important of whom were Busnelli and Mandonnet, to try to demonstrate that Dante nowhere diverged from Thomistic "doctrine" (see the preface to Busnelli's Cosmogonia e antropogenesi, a book dedicated to Pius XI, author of Studiorum Ducem). Nardi's exaggerations in the other direction (Dante's Avicennism, Averroism, emanationism, and PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Duke University; date: 03 September 2016 heterodoxy) must be seen in light of this polemic. Kenelm Foster accurately summarizes the current view: Dante deeply admires Aquinas because Aquinas (especially through his Aristotelian commentaries) formed Dante as an "Aristotelian," but no one would claim today that Dante was ever a "Thomist" in Busnelli's sense; in any case Dante could not have distinguished the "schools" of his time as rigorously as modern scholars do. We might add that we should probably cease to accuse Aquinas (and Dante) of "Aristotelianism," or any other "-ism": as Mark Jordan has pointed out, Aquinas would be stunned to learn he was an "Aristotelian," or even a "philosopher," a term he reserves for non-Christians and often contrasts with Christian wisdom or beatitude. As we have already suggested, and as Jordan has argued in Aquinas's case, to reduce philosophy to "isms" is to reduce it to dogmas, ideologies, bodies of propositions: this is largely a postEnlightenment phenomenon, and foreign to Dante and Aquinas, who considered philosophy (a preliminary training in) the pursuit, and love, of wisdom, truth, and understanding. 3 Wishing to gloss Aristotle's profound silence about "how" the One "gives rise to" the Many, the Neoplatonic tradition, as we have already seen, spoke of an "emanation" in degrees or stages, an outpouring of light from Light in a series of reflexive turnings or hypostases, in which each level of reality causes (gives being to) the next, creating a chain of mediate links between attributeless self-subsistence and contingent finite being. In some ways, this hierarchy fit Aristotle well: it could be (and was, by the Arabic philosophers) identified with the descending sequence of his concentric cosmological spheres, each moved by an immaterial intelligence (soon to become angels), a hierarchy that begins with a transcendent Unmoved Mover "beyond" the world and ends at the center of the world in the realm of sublunar contingency, a kaleidoscope of ephemeral generation and corruption produced by the influence of the turning heavens.
Most of this picture poses little problem for the concept of Christian creation (and is in fact absorbed by Aquinas), on two conditions: (1) the "mediate links" are conceived as concurrent secondary or "nonessential" causes (in the production of differentiation or distinction) within the single PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Duke University; date: 03 September 2016 primary "act" (p.110) whereby self-subsistent Intellect-Being spawns and sustains the totality of finite being; and (2) there is no necessity, no "natural overflowing," in the emanation of the Many from the One (the One does not "need" to produce the Many). In other words, finite being is freely conferred by, or exists by participating in, only self-subsistent Being itself; it cannot be conferred by anything that Being has produced, or that is itself dependent and contingent. The world, in each particular thing and in its entirety, depends directly, immediately, non-dualistically, absolutely, and incessantly on the ground of its being: if the world were completely "other" than, not "one with" (i.e., did not "participate in") that ground, it would not be. To use the closing words of Plato's Parmenides: "if the One is not, nothing is."
4 To lose sight of this point is to lose the very concept of creation, the nexus of identity and opposition between the One and the Many, between the self-subsistent and the contingent, which for medieval Christian thought is the center of all meaning, and which the Christian religion calls "Christ" or the "Word." As we have seen, and shall see more clearly in this chapter and the next, it is the nexus the Comedy embodies in the Primo Mobile.
Neoplatonic emanation, with the conditions stipulated, is thus compatible with Christian creation, and in fact permeates Christian thought on creation. Augustine had already assimilated emanation (in its Plotinian guise) to JudeoChristian creation, with the qualification (itself derived from Porphyry) that was to become the cornerstone of Christian medieval thought: God is not the Good or One beyond being, but true Being itself, both immanent and transcendent. Recent trends in the study of Aquinas have emphasized more and more the "Neoplatonic" character of his thought, stressing for example the principle of participation as the key to Aquinas's understanding of the relation of creatures (and humans in particular) to divine Being; since each distinction of finite form (essence) reflects a diverse participation in Being, and hence degree of perfection, Aquinas's cosmos is a great and continuous Neoplatonic hierarchy, in which all things freely emanate from, and are permeated by, God, and God "governs the lower things by means of the higher." sui et subiecti), as well as the intelligence of the second sphere, which produces its sphere and the intelligence of the third, and so on. The intelligence of the last sphere, of the moon, produces the matter of the sublunar world; variously disposed by the influence of all nine spheres, this matter is then "stamped" by the intelligence of the sphere of the moon (the dator formarum or agent intellect) with the forms of the elements and their compounds. The whole process has the "necessary" character of a natural mechanism or causal network.
There is no question that Dante is inspired by this "Avicennian" Neoplatonic picture, or even perhaps that (in some qualified sense) "the doctrine of mediate creation insinuated itself into Dante's mind," as Nardi maintained. Nardi relished scandals and polemics, and certainly triggered some by this suggestion, since as Aquinas blandly observes (speaking of Avicenna), that "the heavenly bodies are media in some way between God and things here below even as regards creationis contrary to faith, which teaches that the whole of nature in its first beginning was created directly by God." But The divinely inspired poet gives a momentary trace of formimage, concept, word-to undifferentiated Intellect-Being, as he himself charts or experiences it, but that ephemeral wake or furrow (solco), like all finite being, is contingent, and inevitably dissolves in "the water that flows back smooth."
Only those willing to abandon the familiar names and forms of their finite existence (li vostri liti) and willing to confront the ocean of Awareness or Being itself should dare to follow Dante, and they must stay in his wake, guided by one who can "translate" the ground of being into finite signs or forms, thus revealing it to the reader, or, rather, triggering its selfrevelation in the reader. The warning is not gratuitous: what follows in the canto is meant to drive back those who, not used to feeding on the pan de li angeli-Christ, the source of all being within or as themselves-cannot fathom the real meaning of the bizarre, dry, and "scientific" lecture Beatrice is about to deliver. Those few who have eyes to see or ears to hear may instead hope for a profound experience of revelation or understanding, and be confirmed in their navigation of the deep, their journey in Paradise.
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The theme of the canto, unity in diversity, or the nexus OneMany, is introduced by the pilgrim's arrival in the sphere of the moon (30-36): he is "conjoined" with the solid, nel falso iCerto assai vedrai sommerso nel falso il creder tuo, se bene ascolti l'argomentar ch'io li farò avverso.
La spera ottava vi dimostra molti lumi, li quali e nel quale e nel quanto notar si posson di diversi volti.
Se raro e denso ciò facesser tanto, una sola virtù sarebbe in tutti, più e men distributa e altrettanto.
Virtù diverse esser convegnon frutti di princìpi formali, e quei, for ch'uno, seguiterieno a tua ragion distrutti. Beatrice's point is that the denso/raro explanation, if extended to all the stars, would eliminate all real diversity of form or formal-causal influence (virtù), which leaves the kaleidoscope of sublunar experience unaccounted for. This shows that the "explanation" ultimately explains nothing: an understanding of multiplicity must address the source of determinate form, which by definition must be beyond determinate form, beyond the empirical, in the origin of diverse "formal principles" (71, 147). These, as we shall see, can arise only in Intellect itself, and there is no "how" to that arising.
14 Beatrice proceeds to dismantle Dante's explanation on empirical grounds . If the appearance of dark spots results from patches of rare matter, then those patches must either extend entirely through the moon or alternate with denser matter. The first alternative is not the case, because if it were, then during a solar eclipse-and we must remember this evocation of eclipse-the light of the sun, "ingested" by the rare matter, should glimmer right through the moon, which it does not. If rare and dense matter alternate, then in some areas, where there is dense matter, the light would reflect off the surface, and these areas would appear bright; but the light would penetrate surface areas of (p.115) rare matter and reflect from underlying strata of dense matter, as from a mirror: these reflections from farther in the moon, at a greater distance from the observer, would appear darker. At this point, if the reader has not already turned back, disillusioned by Paradise, Beatrice drives him back with a garage experiment (94-105): to dissolve the illusion that light reflected from a greater distance is dimmer, she tells Dante to take three mirrors, to place two on either side of him, one straight ahead of him and farther away, and a source of light behind his back, to illuminate all three mirrors. There you will see, she says (lì vedrai), if you actually try it (se già mai la provi), that, while the surface area of the light reflected in the central mirror is smaller, it has the same intensity as the light reflected from the closer mirrors.
Textually, as John Kleiner has underlined, this is an extraordinary moment. The fact is that in the central mirror Dante will see no light at all, but only the reflection of his own Paradiso 2 the question of the eclipse/manifestation of the light of Intellect-Being by the human body is-in one of the most breathtaking moves in the Comedy-encoded into the experiment itself: as Kleiner has pointed out, by precisely specifying the location of the mirrors and lamp (and doubling the closer mirror, when one would do), Dante has deliberately inscribed the pilgrim in a cross, in a crucifixion. To see only the body is to fail to see it as the self-manifestation, in the world, of the ground of all being: it is to fail to recognize Christ, resulting in crucifixion. But crucifixion, the voluntary sacrifice of (one's self-identification with) the body, is itself the self-revelation of the divine, of the ground of all being, in the world. The mirror experiment proves to be the key to the canto, a canto that itself provides the key, and serves as a selective gateway, to the Paradiso.
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At this culminating moment, Beatrice changes direction. Reason and demonstration are over; she has set up the trigger for awakening, understanding, intellectus, self-knowledge. The sublime discourse she now gives is not an explanation of "how" the Many arise from the One, the Other from the Same: there can be no such explanation. One must experience that nexus in and as oneself. Having stripped and purified Dante's intellect of concepts and misconceptions, like water denuded of any particular form, Beatrice wishes to "inform" it with pure light itself:
Or, come ai colpi de li caldi rai de la neve riman nudo il suggetto The water imagery, so insistent in the Comedy, is not casual:
as we have seen, water (the substrate or suggetto of snow or ice) takes on and sheds different forms and names, thus becoming in one sense other than itself, while always remaining itself, as, analogously, Intellect-Being "takes on" (but remember it is not a thing!) and sheds the finite forms of reality. Multiplicity, Beatrice observes, arises in the eighth sphere: it thus balances the One (the Empyrean) across the nexus or fulcrum that is the Primo Mobile.
Dentro dal ciel de la divina pace si gira un corpo ne la cui virtute l'esser di tutto suo contento giace.
Lo ciel seguente, c'ha tante vedute, quell'esser parte per diverse essenze da lui distratte e da lui contenute.
Gli altri giron per varie differenze le distinzion che dentro da sé hanno, dispongono a' lor fini e lor semenze. Although I discussed the first two tercets in chapter 1, I may recapitulate here: The "heaven of divine peace" is the Empyrean; the "turning body in whose causal-formative influence lies the being of all it contains" is the Primo Mobile; the heaven with many sights or eyes is the eighth sphere, that of of the fixed stars or constellations. The eighth sphere "distributes" the act of existence through diverse essences (the stars), essences that are distinct from, but nothing apart from or "outside" of, the act of existence they qualify. The seven planetary spheres absorb and dispose these distinct formal-causal influences in different ways, each receiving them from above and radiating them below, thus controlling ("seeding") the incessant generation and corruption of sublunar substances.
Although the picture and its expression are quite Avicennian, The "blessed movers" are angelic intelligences; virtù is the causal-formative influence intrinsic to intellect/will. A particular virtù arises from an intelligence as the "hammer's art" "breathes" from a smith: the intelligence is the smith, the stars are the hammer, the formative influence of the stars "circling upon its unity" in self-knowledge (compare Cv 2.4.18). In a similar way the human rational soul is one, despite the fact that it "resolves" or unfolds itself in or as the varied organs of the body, exercising ("conformed to") the different powers (potenze) of sensation, nutrition, and so forth. What bonds with and "vivifies" the stars or sphere is not the intelligence itself (angelic intelligences, unlike the human soul, are by definition substances "separated from matter," Mixed with, and variously shining through, the matter of the heavenly bodies, like the joy of a soul shining through a living eye, these influences appear as different luminosities, reflecting the joy of the angelic intelligences that are their source (142-148). Hence the dark and the bright (lo turbo e 'l chiaro): hence moonspots.
It may well be that the moonspots are apparent only to unperfected ("sublunar") human vision, which is more attuned to difference, to the obscuring of the light of being by "otherness," than to unity, the nonduality of all things with the light that gives them being. Paradiso 22-that is, from the eighth sphere, the very source of multiplicity itself-he sees the moon ("Latona's daughter") "without that shadow" (senza quell'ombra) that had made him think it had varying density (139-141). The marks of difference, the root of Cain's sad legacy, no longer obscure unity, the light of the Empyrean, to a perfected understanding or love.
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As we saw in chapter 1, Dante and the Neoplatonic tradition tended to identify Intellect or Being with light taken in a strict sense (the so-called metaphysics of light): this is the light that penetrates and sustains the universe, reflecting more in one place and less in another (Pd 1.1-3). Dante's Paradiso is built on representing the light of Intellect-Being through its sensible reflection, through light as a sensory quality. One function of Paradiso 2 and its mirror experiment is to establish, at the outset of the Paradiso, the qualities of sensory at any instant (including the instant of first creation), as thisor-that. As the Nicene Creed makes clear, all things are created by God: whatever is, insofar as it is, "participates" in self-subsistent being, or it would not be. As Aquinas puts it, "a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is this being.God is the cause, not of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being." On the other hand, the changing and ephemeral identities of things are governed by the processes of nature, and in this sense, almost everything is subject to generation and corruption. One might say: insofar as (p.120) things exist, they "depend" directly on the Empyrean; insofar as they exist as this-or-that, most things also depend on nature (particularly on the spheres, beginning from the Primo Mobile).
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All things are therefore created, and most of them are also made. This does not imply that some things (such as the spheres or angels) were created first and then "made" others. It only means that some things are ontologically dependent on others: there is a hierarchy of being in the order of nature (distinction), in which some things cannot exist as what they are unless a whole series of other things exist as what they are. These other things may be said to be logically prior or "prior in nature," but they are not "prior in duration" or in time: nothing stands between any thing and the ground of its being. It is in this sense that Aquinas says, "The corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God"; as he explains, this simply means that "in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place." In other words, there was no becoming. This in no way implies that at the moment of first creation the hierarchy of ontological dependence inherent in the distinction of being did not exist, or that in the first production of things God "had to do something special," which "later" the spheres did. The moment of first creation is only conceptually, but not essentially, different from any other: the only difference is that before that moment there was nothing. Indeed, for Aquinas the created world could very well have always existed, with little consequence for the Christian understanding of creation; we only know that the world is not eternal because Scripture tells us so. The "act" of creation and to what end it creates (the final cause) to the Third Person. Since the three are one, one could say that nothing exists in an absolute sense except love: love may be described either as pure awareness, the power of what is to be (know itself as) all things (this power is the Father); or else it may be described as the world, all the things conscious being gives being to by knowing them as itself (the Son). One could also say that ultimately nothing exists except the principle of form (the Word): the self-determination of the principle of form as this-or-that is love (the Holy Spirit); unqualified, form is pure intelligence or being (the Father).
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In the sense that angels are immaterial intelligences, not "other" than (not alienated from) the ground of their being, and ontologically not dependent on anything created, they are "subsistences" (sussistenze): not contingent or ephemeral. Because they are individual finite intelligences, awareness qualified by some trace of attribute or identity, they are nove: they are new (created), and they are nine (differentiated in perfection), resulting in a hierarchy of nine choirs, corresponding to the nine heavenly spheres. Note that this rise of individual "I am"s from the "I AM" of pure awareness is not an explanation, nor does it admit one. To "gather its rays" into finite intelligences that are mirrors of itself and in which it mirrors itself (quasi specchiato) is intrinsic to the nature of conscious being, to its actuality or goodness or fullness (bontate), and (as we saw in Paradiso 29.142-145) 28 it in no way affects its unity (etternalmente rimanendosi una). Conscious being (form or light) is (in some sense) both the One and the Many, and it is the nexus between them.
Opposed to the nove sussistenze ("nine/new subsistences") are the brevi contingenze or ultime potenze ("brief contingencies" or "last potentialities"), (p.122) whose being in space at any moment in time hinges on a whole series of ontological dependencies within finite being, beginning with the angels (quindi discende). These "generated things" (cose generate) are the transitory names and forms of sublunar experience, which give way one to the other under the influence of the turning heavens (il ciel movendo), whether through inorganic change (sanza seme) or through reproduction (con seme). Nevertheless, these sublunar things too are nothing but the "shining" (raggiare) of the light source (lucente), a radiance now highly qualified, conditional, and ephemeral, being that is almost extinguished in darkness. Note that here, as in Paradiso 29, 29 Dante refers to the angels (the links in the ontological hierarchy) as "act" or "actuality" (giù d'atto in atto), and to sublunar material substances as "potentialities" or "contingencies" (potenze, contingenze). Since matter, as the potential for change exhibited by spatiotemporal form, is the principle of "non-subsistence" (except in the spheres, which are a special case), immaterial intelligences may be thought of as non-contingent actualities in their own nature; on the other hand, as substances whose transitory actuality in no way depends on themselves (they are a constant "becoming" governed by the turning spheres), sublunar material things may be thought of as pure potentiality or contingency.
PRINTED The distinction between generation and creation is spelled out in Paradiso 7:
La divina bontà, che da sé sperne ogne livore, ardendo in sé, sfavilla sì che dispiega le bellezze etterne.
Ciò che da lei sanza mezzo distilla non ha poi fine, perché non si move la sua imprenta quand' ella sigilla.
Ciò che da essa sanza mezzo piove libero è tutto, perché non soggiace a la virtute de le cose nove.
(Pd 7.64-72)
The passage is saturated with "Neoplatonism," as Nardi repeatedly argued. Besides the evident echoes of the "metaphysics of light," it seems explicitly to distinguish "mediate" and "immediate" creation, with the corollary that only what is "immediately" created (sanza mezzo, without an intermediary) is eternal. Although almost universally diffused (non ha poi fine), because it is dependent on nothing but the ultimate ontological principle. In this sense, it is not "other than" the ground of its being: it is not "separable from" or other than the "seal" or "stamp" that determines its finite identity within Intellect-Being itself, so to speak. Any thing that is not dependent on anything created (that is, not subject to anything "new," to anything that now is but once was not, which means to any thing) is fully free: it is governed or controlled by nothing except the ground of all being (which is not a thing). The endless arguments over this passage derive from conflating the ontological hierarchy intrinsic to the cosmos with the "act" of creation itself, and from thinking of creation as a process in time. 33 Beatrice imagines a confused Dante objecting, with respect to her earlier explanation, that since every thing, including the four sublunar elements (acqua, foco, aere, and terra) and all their compounds, is created by God, then everything must be immune to corruption (da corruzion sicure), which certainly does not seem to be the case. Again Beatrice explains that of all the things created, some are ontologically dependent on (informati, "informed by") others (which in no way implies that those other things were created first in time), while some things are dependent on nothing created, but only on Intellect-Being itself. Those that are not dependent on (p.124) anything created (that is, on any thing)
are "created just as they are, in their entire being" (creati sì come sono, in loro essere intero): these are the angels and the heavenly spheres (il paese sincero). What the four elements and all things made of them (in other words, all sublunar objects) are at any given instant (including the instant of first creation) depends on other created things, namely the causalformative influence embodied in the stars and angels (note the word fanno: sublunar things are not "created in their entirety" because they are also made or generated). Hence one cannot have a sublunar object unless one also has angels, stars, heavenly spheres, and matter (which is not a thing, but may be variously conceived as the spatiotemporal "substrate" of the sensible universe, the potential for change and multiplicity in spatiotemporal form, or the "otherness" or duality between their coming and going (generation and corruption) are completely subject to the processes of nature, internal to the mechanism of the world.
As we saw in discussing the creation passage of Paradiso 29 (in the "Dante" section of chapter 2), the spheres are a special case: even though they are spatiotemporal (material), Beatrice says that they too, like the angels, were "created as they are, in their entire being." This is because the spheres are made of ether, a fifth element (quintessence) that does not mix with or change into any other element: its potentiality is completely exhausted (actualized) by the forms of the spheres. Remember that form gives being to matter: to have created the spheres is to have created spatiotemporal bodies with no potential for change, but only for motion. Not dependent on any created thing, immune to any process of generation and corruption, the material spheres are in time, move in time, and in fact generate time, but they are immune to time: they are aeviternal. 34 They are both within and beyond the order of nature: in it, but not subject to it. Indeed by existing in spacetime they themselves generate the processes of nature and its laws: they are the "instruments" of angelic intelligences, which "reside" beyond nature in the Empyrean. The spheres are thus the mezzo or medium between Intellect-Being and fluitans materia, sublunar contingency. In the Comedy, the spheres or stars become an emblem of salvation: salvation (Christ's revelation) is to be able to live within time, as a mortal creature subject to, and with a character and physical attributes completely determined by, the order of nature (the stars), and yet to transcend time and nature, by coming to know oneself as (one with) the ground and source of all finite being, as immune to the power of any created thing. This is one reason why the souls of the blessed appear to the pilgrim within the spheres that determined their character, dispositions, and earthly destiny, although they "live in" and are not "other than" the Empyrean.
PRINTED 
Body and Soul
Both Paradiso 7 and Paradiso 13 emphasize the "mechanistic" causal subjection, ephemerality, and contingency of sublunar things for a specific purpose: in order to distinguish the human intelligence or rational soul from such things. (p.125)
In Paradiso 7.70-72 Beatrice says that what rains from divine goodness without a medium (mezzo) is "fully free, because it is not subject to the influence of the new things," which means not subject to anything, since all things are "new" (created). The paradigm of this freedom is an angelic intelligence.
Beatrice continues by saying that "the more conformed" an intelligence is to "the divine goodness" that is its source, the more it "pleases" that source, because the power of selfless love (l'ardor santo) is greatest (più vivace) in what is most like that source. All of this applies equally to human intelligence:
Più l'è conforme, e però più le piace; ché l'ardor santo ch'ogne cosa raggia, ne la più somigliante è più vivace.
Di tutte queste dote s'avvantaggia l'umana creatura, e s'una manca, di sua nobilità convien che caggia.
Solo il peccato è quel che la disfranca e falla dissimìle al sommo bene, per che del lume suo poco s'imbianca. spatiotemporal form, paradigmatically the body: it is to experience oneself as enslaved and mortal by identifying
oneself entirely with what is subject to natural causality and corruption, which is to petrify, obscure, or eclipse the light of intellect in oneself. Beatrice is saying that in its true, original, and redeemed nature, the human soul or intelligence is wholly free-in no way dependent on or governed by the order of nature, or any thing. Thus it is radically different from plant and animal life, which is entirely subject to natural causality and therefore contingent and ephemeral:
L'anima d'ogne bruto e de le piante di complession potenzïata tira lo raggio e 'l moto de le luci sante; ma vostra vita sanza mezzo spira la somma beninanza, e la innamora di sé sì che poi sempre la disira.
(Pd 7.139-144)
The souls of all plants and animals are "drawn from" varying compounds of the sublunar elements (complession potenzïata)
by the influence of the stars, but human life (the human intelligence or rational soul) "breathes directly" from the "supreme beneficence," from Intellect-Being itself. That is why the human mind or soul is always in love with, and never ceases to seek union with, the ground of its being, of all being.
(p.126) Beatrice's distinction between plant and animal life on the one hand, and human intelligence on the other, is loaded, because a human being, as an earthly spatiotemporal creature, a mortal natural organism, is a complex of attributes, physical characteristics, tendencies, dispositions, emotions, abilities, mental patterns, vocations, and character, and all of these are very much part of the processes of nature, they are very much determined by the stars. 38 That is precisely why, by identifying ourselves exclusively with them, we "disfranchise" ourselves, alienating ourselves from the ground of all being, and assimilating ourselves to animals whose entire being is simply an ephemeral production of nature. It is, like Ulysses, not to know one's "seeding," or to confuse it with the "seeding" or generation of the body.
The body, or human animal organism itself (what Dante in the
Convivio calls l'anima in vita), is produced by the processes of nature, just as animals are. We have seen that in Aristotelian thought soul is a "serial" concept: 39 in the progression from vegetative to sensitive to rational soul, each stage in the series presupposes, and in some sense assimilates, all the preceding stages. In the series nutrition, sensation, and intelligence, each power or life principle is subsumed by the next as a facet of its greater possibilities of being. Thus sensation, as we saw, is a kind of proto-intellect, a capacity to take on a limited range of being (specific qualities within a certain range of intensity), but it is completely dependent on bodily organs, and thus ephemeral. The sensitive soul, or living organism, is the "greatest work" that the processes of nature (things) can produce. Since the human potential intellect, or rational soul, is a power to take on or encompass the forms of all things, it certainly cannot be any of those things, or be produced by any thing: it radically transcends the order of nature. As Aristotle explained, it comes "from outside" and is immune to all natural processes; as Dante says, it "breathes" only from God, in whose unqualified existence it shares.
The generation or "seeding" of the human animal organism (the sensitive soul or anima in vita) through the processes of nature is spelled out in detail by Statius in Purgatorio 25.37-60. The active power of the semen first informs menstrual matter with a nutritive life principle corresponding to that of a plant; continuing its work, it becomes a sensitive life principle with powers of movement and sensation, and as such produces, through the processes of nature (natura [60] ), all the members and organs of the fetus. Now, says Statius, comes the critical point or nexus (tal punto [62] ), which has misled even the wise, namely Averroës: how the fetus is transformed from a mere living thing or animal (animal) into a "speaker" or human child (fante), a rational soul, a user of language (61-66). Why is this point so critical? Because not to see this point clearly is to be blind to the Christic nexus between the natural and the transcendent, the human and the divine: it is either to "disjoin" (64) the possible intellect from the living organism (like Averroës) or to conflate the two. In either case, it is to consider oneself an ephemeral product of nature, which is to eclipse the light of being in oneself, which is to crucify Christ (to fail to recognize Christ). Note that this lesson is given by Statius, who has himself (p.127) just been liberated from any self-subjection to the finite through a
Christlike resurrection or revelation , and that he gives it on the threshold of the seventh ledge, the ledge of lust or body identification, just after the culmination of the Comedy's meditation on its own revelatory poetics in Purgatorio 24. 40 Statius now dramatically reveals truth:
Apri a la verità che viene il petto; e sappi che, sì tosto come al feto l'articular del cerebro è perfetto, lo motor primo a lui si volge lieto sovra tant' arte di natura, e spira spirito novo, di vertù repleto, che ciò che trova attivo quivi, tira in sua sustanzia, e fassi un'alma sola, che vive e sente e sé in sé rigira.
41 When nature has finished the production of the fetus or living organism, completing also its brain, its work in making a human being is done. The First Cause now turns to this "great work of nature" (tant' arte di natura), and breathes into it "a new spirit, full of power," which subsumes the active life principle of the fetus (corresponding to the sensitive soul) into its own substance, making one soul: this "new spirit" is the rational soul, created "directly" by God, and dependent on no thing. Thus this soul not only "lives and feels" (vive e sente), through the powers of nutrition and sensation it has subsumed; it also "turns itself upon itself" (sé in sé rigira): like the angels, and the ultimate ontological principle itself, it is a power of self-awareness or consciousness or self-knowledge, a power to know all things as itself, and to know itself as (one with) the ground of all things.
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That this self-knowledge or self-awareness is obscured more in one human being than another is the fault of nature, of the whole process of generating the human organism that Statius has just outlined. In simple terms, the ground of all being is more or less manifest in different human beings, depending on their physical characteristics, dispositions, and character, which are governed by nature and the stars. Thus the Convivio explains (4.21.5-8) that the "distance" of the human possible intellect from the pure Intelligence that is its source depends on the more or less limiting characteristics of the human organism into which it descends, and these depend on the semen and on the dispositions of the inseminator (seminante) and of the heavens or constellations. If the receiving (sensitive) soul is pure, then the intelligence will be "well abstracted and absolved from all bodily shadow" (bene astratta e assoluta da ogni ombra corporea) and the power of divine intelligence will multiply in it; this is the seed (seme) of happiness. The same point is made just after the passage discussed earlier from Paradiso 13: the compounds of elements (cera or "wax") from which the turning heavens (il ciel movendo) generate "brief contingencies" may be better or worse suited to receive that heavenly influence, which is why (p.128) one tree gives more fruit than another, and why humans are born with different dispositions (con diverso ingegno) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) . If those compounds were worked to the perfect point (se fosse a punto la cera dedutta) and the heavens aligned to exert their greatest power, the light of the imprinting seal would be completely manifest (la luce del suggel parrebbe tutta): the Trinity or ground of being would be fully revealed in human form (73) (74) (75) Però se 'l caldo amor la chiara vista de la prima virtù dispone e segna, tutta la perfezion quivi s'acquista.
Così fu fatta già la terra degna di tutta l'animal perfezïone; così fu fatta la Vergine pregna.
43 At the moment of first creation, and at the Incarnation, the "informing stamp" of the Trinity (the "first power," "clear sight," "warm love") perfectly disposed and aligned nature through the whole ontological hierarchy, so that the fullness of divine being was manifest in nature (quivi) through the human form, the greatest work of nature. Note the equivalence of Adam and Christ: in the case of Adam (at the moment of first creation) the compounds of elements (la terra, or cera dedutta) were perfectly disposed at their peak or punto, to be "worthy" of the perfection or summit of all organic life (l'animal perfezïone), which allowed the rational soul to fully manifest its divinity as, through, and in a perfect human being; in the second case (the Incarnation), the informing power of Intellect-Being directly impregnated the Virgin. In both cases the result was the same: the divine revealed itself in nature as or through the human form, thus revealing the true or original nature of the human being as divine. We might add that according to the Vita Nova (29.2-3), this perfect disposition of nature, or concurrence of secondary causes, also occurred at the birth of Beatrice, which is why she is a miracle (a nine), a self-revelation of the Trinity within the world.
It is essential to realize that no matter what one's naturedetermined characteristics and character may be, they in no way preclude the human soul from coming to self-knowledge, from Christically awakening to its transcendence of nature, precisely because the human soul or intelligence is The freedom of the human intellect/will is precisely that it lies subject to a higher power and greater nature than the natural world: because it is only created (cria) and not generated (it rains directly from the Empyrean, so to speak), the heavens have no power over it. Blindness to this truth led the ancients to make the planets that initiate human actions into gods (Pd 4.58-63): this blindness, or failure to see/recognize Christ, is the essence of paganism (26-27, 64-69).
As our discussion has shown, the freedom of the will, in Christian thought, is not a question of having many choices, as in a supermarket. To be free is not to be in the power of any thing that exists, to know oneself as ontologically prior to the order of nature, one with the Empyrean itself, even though as a spatiotemporal being one is also a product of nature. That is why the freedom of the will is at the core of Christian revelation, and why a meditation on broken vows, and on different degrees of beatitude (Pd 3-4), immediately follows the meditation on body, light, and crucifixion in Paradiso 2. The pilgrim wants to know why Piccarda should have a lesser degree of beatitude if she was forced to break her vow of renunciation against her will. Beatrice first clarifies that blessed souls reside not in the planets that determined their character, but all equally in the Empyrean (i.e., beyond the In the standard view, which is virtually universal, Beatrice would be saying that God "directly created" the human body "in its entire being" (like the angels, the rational soul, and Beatrice is of course saying something different, more coherent, and more interesting. O'Keeffe observes (61) (62) that the argomentare Beatrice suggests is an argumentum convenientiae ("of fittingness"), a set of considerations that allow one to make a case for the resurrection of the body, even on rational grounds. The principal ground (quinci) is that the rational soul transcends nature and always desires la somma beninanza, union with the beatitude that is its source (142-144); an added consideration (se tu ripensi) is that the human body and the human soul were created not as separate things, but as one: to create a human being is to create an embodied life principle or intelligence, not a Platonic soul on the one hand, and on the other a body in which to trap it. (In other words, not only was the "body" not created "in its entire being," it was never created at all as a "thing": what was created was a human being.) Besides the parabolic authority of Genesis (1.26-27, 2.21-22), Beatrice is drawing on the profound Aristotelian principle that the soul is the form of the body: it gives it being. The body is ontologically dependent on the soul and has no existence apart from it, as all creation depends on Intellect-Being, and matter (p.131) on form. Now the rational soul is immortal, since it is not dependent on nature. Because the rational soul or intelligence subsumes as itself the nutritive and sensitive life principles of the body, the natural entelechy or perfection of the immortal human soul is embodiment: it is in a sense incomplete, not fully itself, if it does not exercise all its intrinsic powers as or through a body. Incomplete, it would never experience the perfection of beatitude toward which its very nature disposes it, which means it would desire what is unattainable, which is against philosophical and natural principles. 47 From all these considerations one might reasonably postulate the resurrection of the body. In fact, in Dante's otherworld, souls cannot even wait for the resurrection: Statius explains that upon death, human souls, carrying with them both "the human and the divine" (both the nutritive-sensitive and the intellective powers), unfold their powers of life and sensation as temporary aerial bodies, through which they act and feel .
How then did Adam and Eve, and all their progeny, come to suffer death, if the soul gives being to the body, and the rational soul is immortal? Beatrice answered this question earlier in her talk, in the passage with which this section opened (Pd 7.73-81): only sin disfranchises the human creature and makes it dissimilar to its source, the sommo bene. Sin, Beatrice says, is a mal dilettar, a faulty seeking of delight or pleasure, through which "our nature" removes or distances itself from Paradise (82-87). In the subsection on Pyramus and Thisbe (in chapter 3) I glossed this mal dilettar as the "hypnosis of the finite," the obscuring or petrification of the light of intellect by an obsessive self-identification with the body, a seeking of oneself as "other" through the senses.
Remember that intellect, as nothing in itself, is what it identifies itself with; an embodied intellect that remains awake to its own transcendence (its "source") lives in time but not subject to time, in the eternity that is the now, the Christic point or nexus between space-time and its ground; nor perhaps does such an intellect lose the formative power over nature intrinsic to conscious being. If it forgets itself-forgets, like Adam, that it already is potentially all things in all time-it experiences itself merely as the greatest work of nature, a sensitive soul or organism, and thus experiences the natural fate of that organism; it also loses its power over nature. 48 In simple terms, to alienate oneself from the ground of all being, and identify oneself instead with what is contingent, ephemeral, and subject to nature, is to suffer the fate of such things, and to lose all power over them.
How is eternal life regained? Beatrice goes on to explain, in effect, that despite the penitential correctives through which an obscured intellect can, and must, retrain its search for happiness (i.e., from "outside" to "inside"), there is no way it can come to clarity and redemption on its own, overcoming its own Ulyssean madness (follia [93] ), unless the Light itself clears it, so to speak (82-93). In the most exalted and magnificent manifestation of its own nature (both as selfgiving and as justice) "between the last night and first day" (i.e., in all time, seen as a collapsed point), the "divine goodness" did this clearing by sacrificing itself to take on the human form as Christ and then sacrificing that form in Crucifixion, thus making humans themselves (those (p.132) with eyes to see and understand [94] [95] [96] ) capable of raising themselves (97-120). To "raise themselves" is to regain the Empyrean through their own awakening to the ground of all being, which is really the awakening of that ground to itself in them. Beatrice has re-expressed the great Clementine dictum that God became man so that man may learn from man how to become God.
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Time On the threshold of the Primo Mobile, and about to leave the eighth sphere, the source of spatiotemporal multiplicity, the pilgrim has his last look back into space and time. Beatrice tells him to turn his eyes from above to below, and to "see how he has turned" (Adima / il viso e guarda come tu se' volto ). The pilgrim obeys:
